Towards an independent and effective judiciary in Africa

A. M. Akiwumi analyses the independence of the judiciary in Africa and proffers solutions on acheiving this goal. "...Constitutional provisions may not .by themselves ensure the independence of the judiciary. The role of the Chief Justices and Presidents of Constitutional Courts is to ensure the independence of the judiciary. This role, however, requires someone who is eminently independent and who can put his mark on the image of the judiciary and the legal system...Generally, the position of judges of African Commonwealth countries, who are not treated as civil servants, and whose emoluments are protected by being charged on the Consolidated Fund, have been specifically safeguarded by the constitutions of some of these countries...so long as judges are appointed, paid, promoted, or removed from office by persons or institutions controlled directly or indirectly by the Executive, the judiciary's independence may be more theoretical than real...The lack of executive interference in the proceeding for the removal of a judge from office and which reinforces the doctrine of separation of powers, is more clearly expressed in the Constitution of Kenya. The President has no independent power to remove judges which can only be done by a tribunal composed of retired or active judges and senior legal practitioners, appointed by the President, and which the President can only do, if the Chief Justice represents to the President that the question of removing a judge from office, should be investigated..."