My Beauty Best Teacher

In the short term, military force might be able to install Ouattara as President of Ivory Coast. But the ethnic and religious divisions of the civil war have been reopened, and deepened. Ivory Coast desperately needs a healing figure, somebody who is not Ouattara or Gbagbo. Having been imposed on Abidjan by force, Ouattara will only stay there by force. The future looks bleak...[continue reading]

Left, Alassane Ouattara, right: Laurent Gbagbo.images by Stefan Meisel, copyright Demotix

In order to better understand the origins of the current political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, it is necessary to place recent events within the context of the post-colonial era.
Post-Colonial Politics
Félix Houphouët-Boigny was the first president of Côte d'Ivoire from its independence in 1960 to his death in 1993. Henri Konan Bédié, president of the national assembly succeeded the deceased president in accordance with the Ivorian constitution. In 1995, Henri Konan Bédié remained in power, having been elected with 96.44% of the vote.
Politician Laurent Koudou Gbagbo called a boycott of this presidential election due to reforms that had been implemented to the electoral code. He was elected as a member of parliament in his constituency after his party, the FPI (Ivorian Popular Front), won five of the eight seats in the elections.
General Robert Guéï overthrew President Bédié on December 24, 1999, after the latter attempted to change the constitution in his favor.
Presidential elections were then held in 2000 and Guéï was beaten by Laurent Koudou Gbagbo. The elections were marred however, by the elimination of several candidates by the Supreme Court including former president Bédié and politican Alassane Ouattara because of ”dubious nationality”, forgery and use of a false identity. During Ouattara's prime ministerial rule under President Houphouët-Boigny, Gbagbo was imprisoned as a political opponent in 1992 and sentenced to two years in jail, although he was released after seven months...[continue reading]

The Republican forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara, the internationally recognised winner of Ivory Coast's election last November, are, as I write, in the final stages of a violent showdown in the capital, Abidjan, to oust the recalcitrant losing president, Laurent Gbagbo. This is proving to be a bloody last stand as the former history professor, Gbagbo, seems to have ignored the lessons of the past. In 1990 the Liberian autocrat Samuel Doe was captured by rebels in Monrovia and tortured to death; a year later the Somali strongman Siad Barre fled into exile as a rebellion approached Mogadishu; the Zairean despot Mobutu Sese Seko also fled his capital in 1996 as rebels approached.

There is little common ground between the realities faced by the population of Burkina Faso and international requirements and the shortfall in grain production and worsening of hunger in the past years can largely be attributed to this fact. It is not that farmers are unable to produce a sufficient quantity of food, it is that they find themselves in a political system that will not allow them to fulfill their potential. Not consulted in policy debates and uninvited to discussions, they feel excluded from the system when in reality they are key actors. What is more, farmers do not always understand how policy demands play out in these domains. Yet these are the people who suffer the effects of policy choices. In my view, the problem really lies here at the level of policy.

The parallels between Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe are striking: both were once viewed as the singular successes in their respective regions, the envy of their neighbors. Both Mr. Gbagbo, a former history professor, and Mr. Mugabe, a serial graduate student, are highly educated men who helped liberate their countries from authoritarian regimes.Both later clothed themselves in the racist vestments of extreme nativism. Mr. Gbagbo claimed that his rival Alassane Ouattara couldn’t stand for president because his mother wasn’t Ivorian; Mr. Mugabe disenfranchised black Zimbabweans who had blood ties to neighboring states (even though his own father is widely believed to have been Malawian)

Most of the political parties still in power in southern Africa were originally anti-colonial liberation movements — like those in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola — and they tend to abhor the aura-diminishing prospect of seeing any of their fellows

I see no better way to destroy the entrenched corrupt elite interests in the body politic of the Ivorian state other than a protracted civil war. For war destroys old centres of power, discredits old forms of social control, undermines the legitimacy of old politics, etc. All these processes allow new and more enlightened forces to emerge and gain control. The most successful nations in Africa today – Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda and to an extent the early Uganda under Museveni – had all gone through this process of social shredding. It is this social shredding that Ivory Coast desperately needs.
Neither UN nor AU intervention is good for Ivory Coast. The best solution for that country is to allow Ouattara and Gbagbo to contest in the real court of effective state formation – the military. The winner will have to be the one who is able to organise people and mobilize resources to secure victory. Only an organisation with such capacity can reconstruct the Ivorian state. The UN and AU intervention may achieve short term humanitarian objectives. But this will most likely be at the price of disabling the mechanisms, however destructive in the short term, that can produce a durable solution.

A couple of years ago, another African leader, former President Ket Masire of Botswana told me that from his experience in office, many problems on our continent stem from our collective reluctance to call a spade a spade. We would rather use euphemisms and call a spade 'an agricultural tool', hoping some people would understand we are referring to a spade. In my professional life, I have seen people react to difficult problems in two ways: some people make the problems more complicated and intractable by piling on pre-existing grievances and other externalities; others break down the issues into easily solvable chunks or bits, and then aggregate the small solutions from each of the chunks into a comprehensive big solution. I belong to the second school of thought. Points about nationalism, sovereignty, the colonial heritage and neo-colonialism, the CFA franc and the stranglehold on our economies, the role of the French and the international community, are all legitimate, but should be debated on a separate track; because, in my view, these are externalities to the key question of who had the most legitimate votes and therefore won the second round of the Ivorian presidential election of November 28, 2010.